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Frank: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction--An Opposing View

FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTIONAN OPPOSING VIEW
Jonx P. FRNK*

There is now pending before the country a proposal of the
American Law Institute to revise the Federal Judicial Code.
This proposal, if adopted, would eliminate from the federal jurisdiction and move over to the state courts a very large part of
the diversity jurisdiction. Sponsors think that the cut would be
about fifty per cent of all diversity cases. I believe the number
would approach sixty per cent. Whatever it is, it is a big cut.
Let me take it in terms of purely personal experience. At this
moment, I have four federal cases. In one, an Arizona resident
has sued a national insurance company for 300,000 dollars, alleging some breach of duty in connection with an automobile insurance contract. This would be knocked out on two grounds under
the proposal-the Arizona resident could not sue in federal
court and the corporation, which is doing business in Arizona
and which maintains an establishment there out of which this
claim arose, would not be regarded as diverse for this purpose.
Second, I have a much larger contract suit involving an
Illinois corporation and an Arizona resident. There are numerout claims, some of which probably arise out of activities of the
corporation's establishment in Arizona and others that do not.
It is a cumbersome case-we have had about thirty court days
in it already and more coming. Under the proposed draft, on
top of all our other issues, we would need to determine how
much of the case arises from the Arizona "establishment" of the
corporation and how this affects where the whole lawsuit ought
to be.
Third is a case in which two Arizona residents are seeldng to
determine whether movements of the Colorado River have resulted in a change of title to land. It is an accretion case, and there
are numerous California defendants. Because of peculiar details
of the law of accretion as it applies to interstate rivers, the practical effect of determining the title of the property will also
determine where an interstate boundary lies. Under the proposed revision, this case could not possibly be in the federal
district court because the plaintiffs are Arizonians. Because of
the interstate implications of the case, it is particularly desirable
*LL.B., University of Wisconsin, 1940; J.S.D., Yale University, 1949;
Partner, Lewis, Roca, Scoville, Beauchamp & Linton, Phoenix, Arizona.
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to have it in the federal court, but under the proposal, out it
goes.
In terms of hard dollar values, perhaps the largest of these
suits is the fourth, an action for breach of contract by an Arizona
corporation against an eastern concern. The Arizona producers
allege that the eastern corporation entered into a contract to
distribute items produced by the Arizona company and then
failed to use its best efforts to do so. Because it is a best efforts
case and because thousands of sales may need to be taken into
account, quite possibly the best place to handle the case would
be in a federal district court in the east, where the records are;
and we shall, in behalf of the eastern corporation, make an effort
to transfer the case, therefore, to the eastern district on a forum
non conveniens basis. Under the proposed amendment, it is
doubtful whether this case could be in the federal district court
at all because it may well arise from activities of an Arizona
establishment-I am not deep enough in the case to be sure. If
it could not be in the federal court to start with, then of course
it could not be transferred to the location of the records; and in
that case, we would find ourselves trying a case involving some
two million dollars in damages with the relevant documents and
witnesses all two thousand miles away. Moreover, we might find
ourselves trying the case before a state judge who had no real
experience in matters of this kind.
It is apparent that if Professor Field's proposal is to become
law, I had best find, not necessarily another line of business,
but certainly another place in which to earn my living. In this
I am not alone.
In preparation for these remarks I have had a review made
of approximately 100 recent cases from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division
-the San Francisco District Court. Of suits brought by individuals, out of 56 cases, 30 could not have been brought in the
federal district court under this proposal. Of cases brought by
corporations, it appears that 20 out of 27 could not have been
so brought. Putting together both the original and the removal
cases, the percentage declined in jurisdiction on those 100 cases
would be sixty per cent.
A similar study was made for the district in Arizona. Again
on a sample of approximately 100 cases, fifty-three per cent
would have been excluded by this revision.
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There were about 67,000 civil cases filed in the federal courts
last year, of which about 43,000 were private civil cases. Of
those, roughly 19,000 were federal question cases and roughly
20,000 were diversity cases. Of those diversity cases, some 5,300
were in contract and some 14,000 were in tort. Of the torts,
about 11,500 were personal injury cases, 8,000 or so being automobile accident cases and the rest being others.
But do not ask, gentlemen of the Fourth Circuit, for whom
the bell tolls-it also tolls for thee. In this circuit last year,
there were 550 diversity cases filed in contract and around 1,200
in personal injuries, as well as miscellaneous other diversity
litigation. It is therefore apparent that this reallocation of
where we are to do our business hits everyone, and it hits hard
indeed. The essentials of this proposal are first, that no one
can invoke diversity jurisdiction, whether originally or on removal, in any state in which he is a citizen. No corporation can
either originate or remove a case on grounds of diversity in any
state in which it maintains a local establishment if the cause of
action arises out of the activities of that local establishment.
Pretty obviously there would only rarely be a suit which did not
arise out of the activities of the local establishment. Specifically
knocked out, for example, are any corporations which maintain
offices which sell insurance or securities or real property or
maintain a showroom or engage in production of processing if
the suit relates to any of these things.
I am opposed to this proposal to gut the diversity jurisdiction.
My objection is entirely in principle, and I shall take no time
to talk about this detail or that. I freely grant that if the goal
is to run a steam roller over diversity, this is a fine way to do it;
the craftsmanship of the draft is excellent. To change a figure
of speech, the amputation is clean and complete. There is nothing
wrong with this proposal except its substance.
We are dealing with an alteration of the legal system of major
proportion. This is not some pee-wee question which will affect
an isolated case here and there. To accept the calculation of the
sponsors of the change themselves, something over 10,000 cases
are going to be put out of the federal court system and into the
state court systems in one year. Simply in terms of the numerical
shift of cases from one court system to another, I believe that no
legislation in the history of the United States has affected in
substantial fashion so many cases in its first year of operation.
The proposal, accepting the figures of its sponsors, will knock
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out of the federal court system something over twenty-five per
cent of all the private civil cases in it.'
We must not shrink from any proposal merely because it is
drastic. If the need is great enough, a drastic solution may be
essential, and it frequently is. But before a drastic remedy is
adopted, there ought to be at least some substantial reasons for
doing so. The most astonishing aspect of this particular cure
is that to date we have been given substantially no diagnosis of
the illness to be cured, no reasons for adopting this particular
solution. The 215 page pamphlet in which this remedy is advanced contains scarcely a page in it telling us why to adopt the
proposal at all. All jurisdictional changes ought to be the product of a need. Historically all substantial changes have been
the product of needs. What need is suggested here to warrant
this change? In all the discussions so far, only two grounds
have been suggested:
1. There is a suggestion that federal justice is being delayed
by an expanding work load and that this causes undesirable
pressure for expanding the federal court system. We are given
no evidence at all as to just how it is that the diversity cases are
causing this result, and we are certainly not told why the system
should not be expanded to take care of these cases.
Let me be concrete about this in terms of the Fourth Circuit.
In this circuit, the median time for disposition of all private
civil cases for 1964 was 7.5 months from filing to final disposition. The Western District of Virginia was whizzing the
cases through with a median of five months, the Northern District of West Virginia in three months. Maryland was ten
months, and the Eastern District of North Carolina thirteen.
The figures are not as clear as they might be, but, so nearly as
can be told, not even the Eastern District of North Carolina has
its problems principally with diversity-it has an exceptionally
heavy weight in other areas including particularly habeas
corpus. If the object therefore is to reduce congestion, this particular revision is not created to fit you.
But let me meet this point head-on, with a more general consideration. Viewing the matter over all, what is the virtue in
taking cases off a crowded federal court docket and dumping
them on a crowded state court docket? This proposal, I submit,
is a kind of a jurisdictional variation of the old three shell game.
You will remember that at the carnivals the sleight-of-hand man
1. This figure excludes habeas corpus.
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stood behind three walnut shells, the pea went under one shell,
and then it vanished-it was never under the shell you expected
it to be under. This jurisdictional proposal has only half the
magic of the three shell game-these 10,000 cases are going to
disappear from under the shell of the federal walnut, but there
is no doubt as to where they are going-they are simply moving
over to a state court shell. Generally speaking the areas which
are behind, are behind in both their federal and state court dockets. I see no merit whatsoever in moving a case from a federal
court docket where it may have to wait two years for disposition
to a state court docket where it may have to wait four.
2. The second principal consideration advanced is that somehow in our federal system, as a matter of political theory, these
are disputes which ought to be handled by the states. This is the
argument from federalism, an argument that somehow in terms
of the theory of national and local interests, these are matters
which the states ought to handle entirely on their own. This is
the argument which uses the phrase that "state cases belong in
state courts."
The real trouble with this argument is that it comes more
than 175 years late. The diversity jurisdiction was expressly
provided in the federal constitution in 1787. The original Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that these cases should be heard in
federal courts, and for almost the first hundred years of American history they were the only private civil cases (apart from
admiralty) which would be heard in the federal courts. George
Washington presided at the birth of this jurisdiction, James
Madison helped put it into the original Judiciary Act, and a
large share of Abraham Lincoln's law practice consisted of trying
in the federal courts exactly the kind of cases which this proposal would eradicate.
There are many functions which the federal courts perform
which may be open to some earnest debate in terms of federalism;
I have heard it earnestly argued that school segregation or legislative redistricting are unsuitable matters for federal court
adjudication. But to argue in terms of the theory of the federal
system that a branch of federal jurisdiction unquestionably
created by our founding fathers somehow conflicts with the
American theory of federal-state relations is unsalable argument.
The founding fathers believed, whether rightly or wrongly, that
the diversity jurisdiction would avoid regional prejudices, that
it would give a fair forum for the business interests of the
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country, and above all that it would achieve a more competent
administration of justice. In pushing for the adoption of the
Constitution, James Madison expressly spoke of the "tardy, and
even defective, administration of justice ...

in some states. ' 2 As

a lawyer more bluntly put it in an argument before the U. S.
Supreme Court in 1797, it was hoped that the federal courts
would "discountenance and reject the errors and irregularities of
the practice of the state courts." 3
We need not now accept the argument of 1789. Conditions may
have changed, and there may be reasons based either on experience or on our expectations for the future. But no serious argument can be made that diversity conflicts with the theory of
federalism for it is of the essence of the theory of federalism;
it is at least as traditionally federal as the Flag and the 4th
of July. If there is to be a change, it will have to be for some
better reason than tradition.
On the affirmative side, diversity is worth its salt.
1. The 10,000 or more cases proposed to be pushed out of the
federal system are in fact being disposed of each year to the
general satisfaction of those who need their disposition. This is
not to say that everyone is happy with the results of every case,
nor is it to say that everyone is happy with the federal court
administration. Good natured losers are hard to find. Not all
federal judges are wiser or abler, nor are all federal procedures
more satisfactory than state procedures. There are areas or
pockets of federal ineptitude or maladministration.
But with a high degree of uniformity, the system has been
generally satisfactory. It is a rare loser who feels that he would
have been much better off in a different system. Where political
considerations make the federal judges poor, they are likely to
make the local judges worse. There is a general feeling that
justice in federal courts is being well administered-there is no
obvious abuse to be corrected.
2. There is great value in the interaction of the two systems.
The success of the federal rules has led to their widespread use
in the states, and the federal system of revision of the rules is
keeping the state procedure moving as well. A major factor here
is cost. My own state is an example. It is a small state with
no funds available for extensive procedural studies. Hundreds
2. ELLIOTT, DEBATES 533.
3. Brown v. von Bramm, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344, 350 (1797).
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of thousands of dollars have been spent to keep the national rules
system current with the needs of the times. My own state was
the first to adopt the original federal rules, was probably the
first to adopt the 1946 amendments, beat the Supreme Court in
the adoption of the 1955 amendments, and was first in adopting
the last two sets of amendments. We have had, in short, the full
benefit of federal rules work which we could not possibly have
afforded for ourselves.
This is by no means a one-way street. The federal system learns
from the states as well. A recent change in the federal rule on
process comes from progress made in Illinois ;4 an impending
change on parties comes from developments in Michigan and
New York ;r a recent change in directed verdict procedure comes
from an earlier rule in Arizona. 6 In instance after instance,
ideas are moving both ways.
I believe that this rules interaction, this great procedural exchange, would be radically limited if the two systems did not
deal with highly similar cases. Fundamentally the exchange depends upon overlapping bars, upon the fact that the most experienced trial lawyers of a jurisdiction are in the state court one
day and the federal court the next. Cutting back the jurisdiction
to federal questions means the creation of a specialty bar-the
Jones Act men, the patent men, the antitrust men, the tax men.
If the two systems are to be kept coordinate, it is useful to have
an interchangeable cog between them, the product of this overlapping jurisdiction.
3. Finally, there are elements of prejudice and competence. A
native given the practical alternative of having a suit against
an out-of-stater in a particular county of his state system may
well conclude that speed, ability, impartiality or plain convenience will be best served in the federal court. The out-of-state
defendant is normally not hurt by this judgment, and the whole
4. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) zath ILr. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, § 14 (SmithHurd 1956).
5. The proposed amendment of FFD. R. Civ. P. 19 draws heavily from Micn.
STAT. ANN. GENmuL COURT RuLE 205 (1963)

and N. Y. Civ. PnAc. § 1001

(1963).
6. Rule 50(a) as amended in 1963 eliminates the requirement that after the

judge has directed a verdict, the jury must sign a piece of paper giving the

verdict which he has already told them they must give. This is an aimless and
stultifying business. Rule 50(a) as adopted in 1963 provides that "the order of
the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent
of the jury." Arizona's Rule 50(e) as adopted in 1961 provided that upon the
grant of a directed verdict it might be entered "by an appropriate order of
the court in accordance with the motion."
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cause may benefit from it. There is not a lawyer in general practice in any state who cannot call to mind a county in which the
quality of state justice is such that he would prefer to go to a
federal court if he could get there.
To this argument, the proponents of slashing diversity say
that the existence of the federal alternative is undesirable because by virtue of it the lawyer "is under that much less pressure to seek improvement in his state's courts." This argument,
that we should give up diversity jurisdiction to make ourselves
so uncomfortable that we will thereupon improve the state courts,
is to me fanciful in the extreme. It is a kind of hair-shirt approach-one should put on the new proposal for the express purpose of being uncomfortable; it is a repentance for one's sins
and an incentive to do better. The suggestion that the litigant,
if dissatisfied with his state justice, should not escape it but improve it, is visionary. The litigant has a problem which needs
solving now, not in some indefinite future. Moreover the concurrent system is one way of developing improvements. Further
isolating justice in the counties is a wrong-way step for improvement.
4. The diversity system provides a legitimate federal service
to the people of the United States. There are federal services
of varying degrees of utility and of necessity, such as the giving
out of seed catalogs, the highway program, the school lunch
program, Social Security. Each of us will have our individual
attitudes about individual ones of these services and the hundreds
like them. But of all these services, the diversity jurisdiction
is the oldest. It is a federal dispute-settling service which has
existed since 1789. The privilege of taking those disputes which
involve citizens of different states into federal courts is a good,
working system. We should preserve it, not because it is old but
because it is useful. We certainly ought not junk it.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss5/4

8

